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Abstract—In this paper, we consider a large scale multiple
input multiple output (LS-MIMO) relaying system, where an
information source sends the message to its intended destination
aided by an LS-MIMO relay, while a passive eavesdropper
tries to intercept the information forwarded by the relay. The
advantage of a large scale antenna array is exploited to improve
spectral efficiency and enhance wireless security. In particular,
the challenging issue incurred by short-distance interception is
well addressed. Under very practical assumptions, i.e., no eaves-
dropper channel state information (CSI) and imperfect legitimate
CSI at the relay, this paper gives a thorough secrecy performance
analysis and comparison of two classic relaying techniques,
i.e., amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF).
Furthermore, asymptotical analysis is carried out to provide
clear insights on the secrecy performance for such an LS-MIMO
relaying system. We show that under large transmit powers,
AF is a better choice than DF from the perspectives of both
secrecy performance and implementation complexity, and prove
that there exits an optimal transmit power at medium regime
that maximizes the secrecy outage capacity.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, LS-MIMO, AF, DF,
performance analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcast nature of the wireless channel gives rise
to many wireless security problems. Traditionally, wireless
security is guaranteed through high layer encryption. With the
development of interception techniques, encryption becomes
more complex, leading to high computation burden. Thanks to
physical layer security measures enlightened by information
theory, we may exploit wireless channel characteristics, i.e.,
fading and noise, to guarantee secure communications [1]-
[4] even without encryption. Thus, the heavy dependence on
complex higher-layer encryption may be dispensed, leaving
more computation resources for communications.
A. Related Works
The performance of physical layer security is usually mea-
sured by secrecy rate, namely the capacity difference between
the legitimate channel (from the information source to the des-
tination) and the eavesdropper channel (from the information
source to the eavesdropper) [5]-[7]. The introduction of relay
into physical layer security can improve the legitimate channel
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capacity through cooperative diversity, and thus enhances
transmission security [8]-[12]. Some feasible relaying schemes
and their performances were discussed in [13]. Similar to the
traditional relaying systems, amplify-and-forward (AF) [14]
and decode-and-forward (DF) [15] are two commonly used
relaying schemes in secure relaying systems.
Intuitively, the position of relay has a great impact on the
secrecy performance. Some optimization schemes for relay
position were presented from the the perspective of minimizing
the interception probability in [16]. If there are multiple relays,
higher performance gains can be obtained by relay selection
or cooperation. In [17], an optimal relay selection scheme was
proposed to suppress the interception probability by exploiting
selective gain in multiple relay systems. Additionally, multiple
relay cooperative beamforming combined with jamming was
also adopted to maximize the secrecy rate in [18] and [19].
Considering the CSI sharing overhead, an iterative distributed
precoding was proposed in [20] to enhance the received signal
power at the destination node and to mitigate the signal
leakage to the eavesdropper simultaneously.
In fact, if the relay is equipped with multiple antennas,
it is likely to enhance the desired signal power and impair
the eavesdropper signal quality simultaneously, and thus in-
crease the secrecy rate. In this context, multi-antenna relays
received considerable attention, and more effective relaying
schemes were proposed to optimize the secrecy rate [21]
[22]. Linear precoding schemes were investigated in a MIMO
relay network assuming global CSI [23]. Moreover, two pre-
coding schemes based on the idea of information leakage
neutralization were proposed to enhance wireless security over
the multi-antenna non-regenerative relay assisted multi-carrier
interference channel [24]. However, the quality and availability
of the legitimate and eavesdropper CSI are two research
challenges. Due to the fact that there is a feedback delay or
error for legitimate channel and the eavesdroppers are usually
well hidden, the relay may only have imperfect legitimate
CSI and no eavesdropper CSI. Therefore, it is impossible
to realize absolutely secure communications over the fading
channel. To this end, the conception of secrecy outage capacity
was adopted to guarantee secure communications with a high
probability [25] [26].
However, without the eavesdropper CSI, a challenging prob-
lem rises when the eavesdropper is close to the transmitter. The
so-called short-distance interception scenario is not yet fully
addressed in literature. Even with a multi-antenna relay, the
secrecy outage capacity is too small to fulfill the requirement
on quality of service (QoS), due to the relatively high quality
2of interception signal. Recently, it is found that large-scale
MIMO (LS-MIMO) systems can significantly improve the
transmission performance by utilizing its enormous array gain
[27] [28]. Through deploying hundreds of or even more
antennas, the spatial resolution of the transmit beam can be
very high even with just simple linear precoding methods, e.g.,
maximum ratio transmission (MRT). Then, the information
leakage to the eavesdropper can be quite small, and is negli-
gible if the number of antennas approaches infinity [29]-[31].
In [32], the achievable secrecy sum-rate based on regularized
channel inversion precoding was derived for large-scale MISO
broadcast channels with confidential message. Furthermore,
large-scale MIMO technology together with artificial noise
(AN) was applied in multicell systems to enhanced wireless
security [33]. It was shown that even with a low complexity
random AN shaping scheme, it was possible to provide a
favorite performance.
Again, the CSI at the LS-MIMO transmitter has a great
impact on the secrecy performance. In general, the CSI in
LS-MIMO is obtained by making use of channel reciprocity
of time division duplex (TDD) systems. Due to duplex delay
or pilot contamination, the estimated CSI may be imperfect,
resulting in inevitable performance loss [34]. To the best
of our knowledge, the research on physical layer security
based on LS-MIMO relaying techniques is just beginning,
especially in the case of imperfect CSI. In [35], we ana-
lyzed the secrecy performance of large-scale MIMO relay
in two-hop secure communications with imperfect CSI, and
derived closed-form expressions of secrecy outage capacity
for amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF)
relaying protocols, respectively.
B. Main Contributions
In this paper, we focus on performance analysis and compar-
ison of two classic relaying schemes, including amplify-and-
forward (AF) and the decode-and-forward (DF), for physical
layer security in an LS-MIMO relaying system with imper-
fect CSI. The contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
1) We are the first to introduce LS-MIMO techniques into
a relaying system, and solve the challenging problem of
short-distance (relay and eavesdropper) interception.
2) We derive explicit expressions of the secrecy outage
capacity for both AF and DF relaying schemes, and
compare their performance under different conditions,
e.g. the CSI accuracy, transmit powers at the source and
the relay, and interception distance.
3) We analyze the asymptotic behavior of secrecy outage
capacity under large transmit power, and obtain some
insights on the secrecy performance as follows:
a) As the transmit power at the source approaches in-
finity, the secrecy outage capacity for both AF and
DF relaying schemes is upper bounded by the same
performance ceiling. The bound is is invariant with
respect to transmit powers, but declines as the inter-
ception distance and the outage probability decrease,
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Fig. 1. An overview of the large-scale MIMO relaying system employing
physical layer security.
and increases as the number of antennas at the relay
adds.
b) As the transmit power at the relay approaches infinity,
the secrecy outage capacity of both AF and DF relaying
schemes tends to zero, but the interception event occurs
with probability 0 and 1, respectively.
c) Under large transmit powers, AF is a better choice than
DF from the perspectives of both secrecy performance
and implementation complexity.
d) Both too low and too high relay transmit powers at
the relay result in poor secrecy performance. There
exits an optimal transmit power at medium regime that
maximizes the secrecy outage capacity.
C. Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first give
an overview and system model of the LS-MIMO relaying sys-
tem employing physical layer security in Section II, and then
derive the secrecy outage capacities for AF and DF relaying
schemes with imperfect CSI, and compare their performance
in Section III. In Section IV, we perform asymptotic analysis to
obtain several insights on the secrecy performance. We then
present some simulation results to validate the effectiveness
of the proposed scheme in V. Finally, we conclude the whole
paper in Section VI.
Notations: We use bold upper (lower) letters to denote
matrices (column vectors), (·)H to denote conjugate transpose,
E[·] to denote expectation, ‖ · ‖ to denote the L2 norm of
a vector, | · | to denote the absolute value, and (a)+ to
denote max(a, 0). The acronym i.i.d. means “independent
and identically distributed”, pdf means “probability density
function” and cdf means “cumulative distribution function”.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a time division duplex (TDD) LS-MIMO re-
laying system, including one source, one destination equipped
with a single antenna each and one relay deploying NR
antennas in presence of a passive eavesdropper, as shown in
Fig.1. It is worth pointing out that NR is usually quite large
3in such an LS-MIMO relaying system, i.e., NR = 100 or
greater. In addition, the eavesdropper is usually a legitimate
destination or pretends to be a legitimate destination [36],
so we consider the eavesdropper is equipped with one an-
tenna, like the destination. The system works in a half-duplex
mode, so the information transmission from the source to the
destination with the aid of the LS-MIMO relay requires two
time slots. Specifically, during the first time slot, the source
transmits the signal to the relay, and then the relay forwards
the post-processing signal to the destination within the second
time slot. Note that the direct link from the source to the
destination is unavailable due to a long distance. Meanwhile,
the eavesdropper monitors the transmission from the relay to
the destination, and tries to intercept the signal. In practice,
the relay is far away from the source, so it is difficult for
the eavesdropper to overhear both the source and the relay.
Following previous related literatures [14] and [17], we also
assume that the eavesdropper only monitors the relay, since it
thought that the signal is from the relay directly.
We use √αi,jhi,j to denote the channel from i to j, where
i ∈ {S,R}, j ∈ {R,D,E} with S,R,D and E representing
the source, the relay, the destination and the eavesdropper,
respectively. αi,j is the distance-dependent path loss and hi,j
is the channel small scale fading. In this paper, we model hi,j
as Gaussian distribution with zero mean and covariance matrix
INR . αi,j remains constant during a relatively long period and
hi,j fades independently slot by slot. Thus, the received signal
at the relay in the first time slot can be expressed as
yR =
√
PSαS,RhS,Rs+ nR, (1)
where s is the normalized Gaussian distributed transmit signal,
PS is the transmit power at the source, nR is the additive
Gaussian white noise with zero mean and covariance matrix
INR at the relay. Through post-processing to yR according to
the CSI hS,R and hR,D, the relay forwards a normalized signal
r to the destination with power PR, then the received signals
at the destination and the eavesdropper are given by
yD =
√
PRαR,DhHR,Dr + nD, (2)
and
yE =
√
PRαR,EhHR,Er + nE , (3)
respectively, where nD and nE are the additive Gaussian white
noises with zero mean and unit variance at the destination and
the eavesdropper.
Assuming the achievable legitimate channel rate and the
achievable eavesdropper channel rate are CD and CE , from the
perspective of information theory, the achievable secrecy rate
is given by CSEC = [CD − CE ]+, where [x]+ = max(x, 0)
[5]. Since there is no knowledge of the eavesdropper channel
at the source and relay, it is impossible to maintain a steady
secrecy rate over all realizations of the fading channels. In
this paper, we take the secrecy outage capacity CSOC as
the performance metric, which is defined as the maximum
achievable rate under the condition that the outage probability
of the transmission rate surpasses the secrecy rate is equal to
a given value ε, namely
Pr(CSOC > CD − CE) = ε. (4)
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND
COMPARISON
In this section, we concentrate on secrecy performance
analysis and comparison of two commonly used relaying
techniques, namely AF and DF, for physical layer security in
an LS-MIMO relaying system with imperfect CSI. In what
follows, we first derive explicit expressions of the secrecy
outage capacity related to a given outage probability for the
two relaying techniques, and then compare their performance
under different channel conditions.
A. Amplify-and-Forward (AF) Case
In this case, the relay forwards the signal rAF via multiply-
ing the received signal yR by a NR ×NR processing matrix
F, namely
rAF = FyR. (5)
We assume the relay has full CSI hS,R through channel
estimation, and gets partial CSI hR,D by making use of
channel reciprocity in TDD systems. Due to duplex delay
between uplink and downlink, there is a certain degree of
mismatch between the estimated CSI hˆR,D and the real CSI
hR,D, whose relation can be expressed as [37]
hR,D =
√
ρhˆR,D +
√
1− ρe, (6)
where e is the error noise vector with independent and identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d.) zero mean and unit variance complex
Gaussian entries. ρ, scaling from 0 to 1, is the correlation
coefficient between hˆR,D and hR,D. A large ρ means better
CSI accuracy. If ρ = 1, the relay has full CSI hR,D. Addition-
ally, due to the hidden property of the eavesdropper, the CSI
hR,E is unavailable. Therefore, F is designed only based on
hS,R and hˆR,D, but is independent of hR,E . Since maximum
ratio combination (MRC) and maximum ratio transmission
(MRT) can achieve asymptotically optimal performance in LS-
MIMO systems with low complexity [27] [28], we design F by
combining MRC and MRT. Specifically, the received signal yR
is first combined with an MRC vector h
H
S,R
‖hS,R‖ , then normalized
by a scaling factor 1√
PSαS,R‖hS,R‖2+1
, and finally multiplied
by an MRT vector hˆR,D
‖hˆR,D‖
. In other words, the processing
matrix is given by
F =
hˆR,D
‖hˆR,D‖
1√
PSαS,R‖hS,R‖2 + 1
hHS,R
‖hS,R‖ . (7)
It is assumed that the destination has perfect CSI by channel
estimation, thus the received signal and the corresponding
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) can be expressed as
yAFD =
√
PSPRαS,RαR,DhHR,DhˆR,DhHS,RhS,R
‖hˆR,D‖
√
PSαS,R‖hS,R‖2 + 1‖hS,R‖
s
+
√
PRαR,DhHR,DhˆR,DhHS,R
‖hˆR,D‖
√
PSαS,R‖hS,R‖2 + 1‖hS,R‖
nR + nD,
(8)
4and
γAFD =
PSPRαS,RαR,D |hHR,D hˆR,D|
2‖hS,R‖2
‖hˆR,D‖2(PSαS,R‖hS,R‖2+1)
PRαR,D |hHR,D hˆR,D |2
‖hˆR,D‖2(PSαS,R‖hS,R‖2+1)
+ 1
=
a|hHR,DhˆR,D|2‖hS,R‖2
b|hHR,DhˆR,D|2 + ‖hˆR,D‖2(c‖hS,R‖2 + 1)
, (9)
where a = PSPRαS,RαR,D, b = PRαR,D and c = PSαS,R.
Based on the received SNR in (9), we have the following
theorem:
Theorem 1: The legitimate channel capacity in an LS-MIMO
relaying system in presence of imperfect CSI can be approx-
imated as CAFD = W log2
(
1 +
PSPRαS,RαR,DρN
2
R
PRαR,DρNR+PSαS,RNR+1
)
when the number of relay antennas is very large, where W is
a half of the spectral bandwidth.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix I.
It is found that the legitimate channel capacity is a constant
due to channel hardening in such an LS-MIMO relaying
system. Similar to (9), we assume the eavesdropper has perfect
CSI by channel estimation, and thus the SNR is given by
γAFE =
d|hHR,E hˆR,D|2‖hS,R‖2
e|hHR,E hˆR,D|2 + ‖hˆR,D‖2(c‖hS,R‖2 + 1)
, (10)
where d = PSPRαS,RαR,E and e = PRαR,E . Hence,
according to the definition of secrecy outage capacity in (4),
we have the following theorem:
Theorem 2: Given an outage probability bound
by ε, the secrecy outage capacity based on the
AF relaying strategy can be approximated as
CAFSOC = W log2
(
1 +
PSPRαS,RαR,DρN
2
R
PRαR,DρNR+PSαS,RNR+1
)
−
W log2
(
1 +
PSPRαS,RαR,ENR ln ε
PRαR,E ln ε−PSαS,RNR−1
)
when the number of
relay antennas is very large.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix II.
Based on Theorem 2, we may obtain the interception proba-
bility PAF0 , namely the probability that the legitimate channel
capacity is less than the eavesdropper channel capacity. By
letting CAFSOC = 0 in (28), the interception probability can be
computed as (11) at the top of the next page.
It is found that the interception probability of AF relaying
scheme is independent of the spectral bandwidth W .
B. Decode-and-Forward (DF) Case
Different from the AF relaying scheme, DF decodes the
received signal at the relay, and then forwards the original
signal to the destination, so as to avoid noise amplification.
Also by using the MRC technique at the relay, the channel
capacity from the source to the relay can be expressed as
CDFS,R = W log2(1 + PSαS,R‖hS,R‖2)
≈ W log2(1 + PSαS,RNR), (12)
where (12) holds true because of channel hardening when
NR → ∞. Then, the relay performs MRT based on the
estimated CSI hˆR,D. The channel capacity from the relay to
the destination is given by
CDFR,D = W log2

1 + PRαR,D
∣∣∣∣∣hHR,D hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2


≈ W log2 (1 + PRαR,DρNR) , (13)
where (13) is obtained similarly to Theorem 1. Thus, the
legitimate channel capacity for the DF relaying scheme can
be expressed as
CDFD = min(C
DF
S,R , C
DF
R,D)
= W log2 (1 + min(PSαS,RNR, PRαR,DρNR)) .
(14)
It is found that CDFD is also a constant due to channel hard-
ening in an LS-MIMO system. Meanwhile, the eavesdropper
intercepts the signal from the relay, the corresponding channel
capacity from the relay to the destination can be computed as
CDFR,E = W log2

1 + PRαR,E
∣∣∣∣∣hHR,E hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2

 . (15)
For the secrecy outage capacity in an LS-MIMO DF relay-
ing system, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 3: Given an outage probability bound
by ε, the secrecy outage capacity for the DF
relaying scheme can be approximated as CDFSOC =
W log2 (1 + min(PSαS,RNR, PRαR,DρNR))
− W log2 (1− PRαR,E ln ε) when the number of relay
antennas is very large.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix III.
Similarly, we can also obtain the interception probability in
this case. Letting CDFSOC = 0 in (35), we have
PDF0 = exp
(
−2
CDFD /W − 1
PRαR,E
)
= exp
(
−min(PSαS,RNR, PRαR,DρNR)
PRαR,E
)
. (16)
It is also found that the interception probability of the DF
relaying scheme is independent of the spectral bandwidth W .
C. Performance Comparison between AF and DF
AF and DF are two commonly used relaying techniques.
Their respective merits have been well studied in literature.
However, less is known about their secrecy performance. In
this subsection, we provide an analytical comparison in terms
of secrecy outage capacity and interception probability, and
provide explicit criterions for choosing between AF and DF.
1) Secrecy Outage Probability Criteria: For a given re-
quirement on the outage probability ε, the difference between
the secrecy outage capacity of AF and that of DF can be
computed as (17) at the top of the next page. Then, given a
set of channel conditions and transmit powers, it is easy to
choose the better relaying technique according to (17). This
result can be explained as follows. AF forwards the noise from
the first hop, which not only degrades the performance at the
5PAF0 = 1− F
(
2C
AF
D /W − 1
)
= exp

− (PSαS,RNR + 1)
(
PSPRαS,RαR,DρN
2
R
PRαR,DρNR+PSαS,RNR+1
)
PSPRαS,RαR,ENR − PRαR,E
(
PSPRαS,RαR,DρN2R
PRαR,DρNR+PSαS,RNR+1
)

 . (11)
∆CSOC = C
AF
SOC − CDFSOC
= W log2
(
(PRαR,DρNR + PSαS,RNR + PSPRαS,RαR,DρN
2
R + 1)(PRαR,E ln ε− PSαS,RNR − 1)
(PRαR,DρNR + PSαS,RNR + 1)(PRαR,E ln ε− PSαS,RNR + PSPRαS,RαR,ENR ln ε− 1)
)
−W log2
(
1 + min(PSαS,RNR, PRαR,D)
1− PRαR,E ln ε
)
. (17)
destination, but also impair the quality of the eavesdropper
signal. In particular, at low source SNR region, the noise
has a greater impact on the eavesdropper signal than the
legitimate signal. In this case, the noise is helpful to improve
the secrecy performance. However, for DF, the benefit brought
be the first hop noise is eliminated through decoding. In other
words, decoding for the legitimate receiver is also in the
interest of the eavesdropper. Thus, AF may outperform DF
in this case. AF and DF have different secrecy performance
under various conditions. Thus, we propose to switch the two
relaying protocols according to system parameters.
2) Interception Probability Criteria: Interception probabil-
ity is the outage probability corresponding to zero secrecy
outage capacity. In other words, interception probability is
the lower bound on the outage probability. Then, in terms of
interception probability, the secrecy performance gap is given
by (18) at the top of this page. Similarly, we can choose the
better relaying technique from the perspective of interception
probability according to (18).
IV. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS
In the last section, we successfully obtained closed-form
analytical results of the secrecy outage capacity for AF and
DF relaying techniques in an LS-MIMO relaying system with
imperfect CSI, and compared their performance. However,
the complex structure of the expressions prevents us from
extracting direct guidelines for system design. In order to
obtain clear insights on the secrecy performance and hence
provide some simple but effective relaying schemes, we carry
out asymptotic performance analysis in two extreme cases, i.e.,
large transmit powers PS and PR. In what follows, we give a
detailed investigation of their asymptotic secrecy performance.
A. AF Case
1) Large PS: In the case of high transmit power PS at the
source, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 4: There exits a ceiling effect on the secrecy outage
capacity at high PS . This bound is invariant with respect to
PS and PR, but declines as the interception distance and the
outage probability decrease, and decreases as the number of
antennas at the relay adds.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix IV.
In this case, for the interception probability, we have the
following lemma:
Lemma 1: Under high PS , the interception probability is
invariant with respect to PS and PR, but increases as the
interception distance and the outage probability decrease, and
decreases as the number of antennas adds.
Proof: From (38), the interception probability for the
AF relaying scheme at high PS can be obtained by letting
CAFSOC = 0 as follows
PAF0 = exp
(
−αR,DρNR
αR,E
)
. (19)
It is easy to validate the claims of Lemma 1 from (19). Note
that if NR is large, the interception probability asymptotically
approaches zero.
Remarks: Combining Theorem 4 and Lemma 1, the secrecy
performance, including interception probability and secrecy
outage capacity, can be improved significantly by increas-
ing the number of antennas at the relay NR. Thus, even
in the short-distance interception scenario, a high secrecy
performance can be realized by adding antennas, which is a
main advantage of LS-MIMO relaying systems with respect
to traditional relaying systems. Again, this result may be well
explained by the extra-high angular resolution of LS-MIMO
which is capable of creating a strong null-space at an even
close-by eavesdropper.
2) Large PR: If the transmit power at the relay PR is
sufficiently large, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 5: At high PR, the secrecy outage capacity is
always equal to zero under arbitrary channel conditions and
transmit powers.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix V.
For the interception of the AF relaying scheme, we also
have the following lemma:
Lemma 2: Under high PR, the interception probability of
the AF relaying scheme is always equal to zero.
6∆P0 = P
AF
0 − PDF0
= exp

− (PSαS,RNR + 1)
(
PSPRαS,RαR,DρN
2
R
PRαR,DρNR+PSαS,RNR+1
)
PSPRαS,RαR,ENR − PRαR,E
(
PSPRαS,RαR,DρN2R
PRαR,DρNR+PSαS,RNR+1
)

− exp(−min(PSαS,RNR, PRαR,DρNR)
PRαR,E
)
.
(18)
Proof: Examining (11), as PR tends to infinity, we have
P AF0
≈ exp
(
− (PSαS,RNR + 1)PSαS,RNR
PSPRαS,RαR,ENR − PRαR,EPSαS,RNR
)
(20)
= 0, (21)
where (20) holds true since the denominator of (20) is equal
to zero.
Remarks: A high PR will result in zero secrecy outage
capacity, so one should avoid using very high transmit power
at the relay. In fact, we have the following lemma regarding
the transmit power PR:
Lemma 3: The secrecy outage capacity first monotonically
increases and finally degrades as PR increases from 0 to
infinity. There exists an optimal transmit power PR at medium
regime.
Proof: As proved in Lemma 2, the secrecy outage capac-
ity tends to zero at high PR regime. Meanwhile, the secrecy
outage capacity is zero at PR = 0. Thus, there must an
optimal transmit power PR at medium regime. Similarly, the
interception probability has the same property.
B. DF Case
1) Large PS: In the case of high transmit power PS at the
source, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 6: There exits a bound on the secrecy outage
capacity at high PS . This bound is invariant with respect to
PS , but declines as the interception distance and the outage
probability decrease, and increases as the number of antennas
at the relay adds. If PR is relatively large, the bound is
independent of PR.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix VI.
According to Theorem 6, it is easy to derive the interception
probability as follows:
PDF0 = exp
(
−αR,DρNR
αR,E
)
, (22)
Remarks: The interception probability decreases as NR
increases. In such an LS-MIMO relaying system, the inter-
ception probability asymptotically approaches zero.
2) Large PR: If the transmit power PR at the relay is
sufficiently large, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 7: At high PR, the secrecy outage capacity is
always equal to zero under arbitrary channel conditions and
transmit powers.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix VII.
Moreover, for the interception probability of the DF relaying
scheme, we have the following lemma:
TABLE I
SECRECY OUTAGE CAPACITY AND INTERCEPTION PROBABILITY FOR AF
AND DF RELAYING SCHEMES AT HIGH TRANSMIT POWER REGIME.
large PS large PR
Secrecy Outage AF W log2
(
−
αR,DρNR
αR,E ln ε
)
0
Capacity DF W log2
(
1+PRαR,DρNR
1−PRαR,E ln ε
)
0
AF 0 0
Interception Probability DF 0 1
Lemma 4: The interception probability of the DF relaying
scheme at high PR is always equal to 1.
Proof: Examining (16), as PR tends to infinity, we have
PDF0 = exp
(
−min(PSαS,RNR, PRαR,DρNR)
PRαR,E
)
= exp
(
−PSαS,RNR
PRαR,E
)
(23)
= 1, (24)
where (24) holds true since the denominator of (23) tends to
infinity.
Note that there also exists an optimal PR at medium regime
in the sense of maximizing the secrecy performance, and due
to page limitation, we will study this problem in our future
works.
In Tab.I, we list the secrecy performance of AF and DF
relaying schemes in an LS-MIMO relaying system, so as to
compare their performance conveniently.
C. Performance Comparison between AF and DF
Similarly, we compare the secrecy performance of AF and
DF relaying schemes based on their asymptotic behaviors, so
as to provide some simple and effective guideline for relaying
scheme selection in different scenarios.
1) Secrecy Outage Capacity Criteria: From the perspective
of secrecy outage capacity, we have the following two lemmas
regarding the relaying scheme selection:
Lemma 5: At high PS regime and PR is relatively large,
DF has the same secrecy outage capacity as DF. Since AF has
lower complexity than DF, it is a better choice in this case.
Proof: It is proved by combining Theorem 4 and 6
directly.
Remark: Due to high PS , the noise at the relay during the
first hop is negligible for AF. Meanwhile if PR is large enough,
AF can asymptotically achieve the same performance as DF.
Lemma 6: Under large PR, the secrecy outage capacity for
both AF and DF tends to zero. So AF is also more appealing.
Proof: It is easy to prove Lemma 6 by combing Theorem
5 and 7.
7Remark: Intuitively, if PR is sufficiently large, the capacities
of the channels from the relay to the destination and from the
relay to the eavesdropper asymptotically approach the same
values, thus secrecy outage capacity tends to zero.
2) Interception Probability Criteria: Again, we can obtain
the following two lemmas regarding the relaying scheme
selection by comparing their interception probability.
Lemma 7: At high PS regime, the interception probability
for both AF and DF approaches zero, so AF is a better choice.
Proof: It can be proved by comparing (19) and (22)
directly.
Remark: Due to high PS , the noise at the relay during the
first hop is negligible. Meanwhile, by making use of the large
array gain of LS-MIMO relay, the capacity of legitimate chan-
nel is always greater than that of the eavesdropper channel.
Thus, the interception probability tends to zero.
Lemma 8: Under large PR, the interception probability for
AF and DF tends to 0 and 1, so AF is more appealing.
Proof: It is obtained from (21) and (24).
Remark: If PR is sufficiently large, for DF, the capacity of
the channel from the relay to the eavesdropper asymptotically
approaches that of the channel from the relay to the destina-
tion. Thus, the interception probability tends to 1. However,
for AF, the noise at the relay is amplified. By exploiting
the array gain of the LS-MIMO relay, the capacity of the
legitimate channel is always greater than the capacity of the
eavesdropper, so the interception probability tends to zero.
Above all, AF is a better choice at high transmit power
regime based on the criterions of secrecy outage capacity and
interception probability. However, as shown later in simulation
results, DF may be better in the low transmit power region.
Hence, there is a switching point between AF and DF from
the perspective of maximizing the secrecy performance.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
To examine the accuracy and effectiveness of the theoretical
results for the LS-MIMO AF and DF relaying systems, we
present several simulation results in the following scenarios:
we set NR = 100, W = 10KHz and ρ = 0.9. The relay is in
the middle of a line between the source and the destination.
We normalize the path loss as αS,R = αR,D = 1 and
use αR,E to denote the relative path loss. For example, if
αR,E > 1, then the eavesdropper is closer to the relay than
the destination. In addition, we use SNRS = 10 log10 PS and
SNRR = 10 log10 PR to represent the transmit signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) in dB at the source and the relay, respectively.
Note that the theoretical results are drawn according to the
derived theoretical expressions, and the simulation results
are obtained by averaging over 10000 times Monte Carlo
simulations under the same condition.
Firstly, we testify the accuracy of the theoretical expression
for the AF relaying scheme with SNRS = SNRR = 20dB.
As seen in Fig.2, the theoretical results are well consistent
with the simulations in the whole αR,E region with different
outage probability requirements, which proves the high accu-
racy of the derived performance expressions. Given an outage
probability bound by ε, as αR,E increases, the secrecy outage
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Fig. 2. Comparison of theoretical and simulation results for the AF relaying
scheme.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of theoretical and simulation results for the DF relaying
scheme.
capacity decreases gradually. This is because the interception
capability of the eavesdropper enhances due to the shorter
interception distance. In addition, given an αR,E , the secrecy
outage capacity improves with the increase of ε, since the
outage probability is an increasing function of the secrecy
outage capacity.
Secondly, we testify the accuracy of the derived theoret-
ical expressions for the DF relaying scheme with SNRs =
SNRR = 20dB. As seen in Fig.3, the theoretical results
coincide with the simulations nicely. Similar to the AF re-
laying scheme, the secrecy outage capacity decreases as αR,E
increases and ε reduces. Note that, compared to the secrecy
outage capacity of the AF relaying scheme in Fig.2, the
secrecy outage capacity of the DF relaying scheme is better
under the same conditions, since the DF relaying scheme
avoids amplifying the noise at the relay at low and medium
SNR regimes.
Thirdly, we validate the function of NR on the secrecy
outage capacity of AF and DF relaying schemes with ε = 0.01,
and SNRS = SNRR = 10dB. As shown in Fig.4, the
secrecy outage capacity can be improved significantly by
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Fig. 4. Secrecy outage capacity comparison of AF and DF relaying schemes
with different NR.
adding antennas, even at a large αR,E . Thus, LS-MIMO
relaying schemes can effectively solve the problem of short-
distance interception. In addition, it is found that the number
of antennas at the relay has different effects on the secrecy
outage capacity for AF and DF relaying schemes. The secrecy
outage capacity of DF with NR = 100 is close to that of AF
with NR = 200 under such condition. Hence, it makes sense
to select the optimal relaying scheme according to system
parameters.
Fourthly, we show the impact of SNRS on the secrecy
outage capacity of AF and DF relaying schemes with ε = 0.05,
αR,E = 1, and SNRR=10dB. As seen in Fig.5, the secrecy
outage capacity of both AF and DF relaying schemes increases
as SNRS adds. However, there exits the same performance
bound at high SNRS regime for both AF and DF, which
confirms the claims in Theorem 4, Theorem 6, and Lemma
5. It is also found that AF performs better than DF at low
SNRS regime, performs poorer at medium SNRS regime,
and has the same performance at high SNRS regime. This
is because at low SNRS , the forwarding noise of AF may
significantly depress the channel capacity from the relay to
the destination, and improve the secrecy performance. But
at medium SNRS , the noise is negligible, so DF performs
better than AF. Therefore, it is better to switch the two
relaying schemes according to system parameters, so as to
maximize the secrecy outage capacity. These cross points are
the switching points indeed.
Then, we investigate the impact of SNRR on the secrecy
outage capacity of AF and DF relaying schemes with ε = 0.05,
αR,E = 1 and SNRS = 10dB. As seen in Fig.6, the secrecy
outage capacity is a convex function of SNRR for both AF
and DF. At low and high SNRR regimes, the secrecy outage
capacity asymptotically approaches zero, and the maximum
secrecy outage capacity appears at medium SNRR regime,
which proves Theorem 5, Theorem 7, and Lemma 6 again.
Different from the function of SNRS , AF first performs poorer,
since AF would amplify the noise at the relay. But, AF
performs better than DF as SNRR increases, since the channel
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Fig. 5. Secrecy outage capacity comparison of AF and DF relaying schemes
with different SNRS .
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Fig. 6. Secrecy outage capacity comparison of AF and DF relaying schemes
with different SNRR .
capacity from the relay to the eavesdropper increases and thus
the secrecy outage capacity of DF decreases sharply. Hence,
it also makes sense to switch the relaying schemes according
to system parameters.
Next, we show the impact of SNRS on the interception
probability of AF and DF relaying schemes with αR,E = 1,
and SNRR = 10dB. It is found from Fig.7 that AF has a zero
interception probability in the whole SNRS region, because it
can always support a nonzero rate, as shown in Fig.3. At high
SNRR regime, the interception probability of both AF and
DF approaches a bound independent of PS and PR, which
reconfirms the claims in Lemma 1 and 7. In this case, due to
a large Nt, the bound on the interception probability in (19)
is nearly equal to zero.
Finally, we investigate the impact of SNRR on the in-
terception probability of AF and DF relaying schemes with
SNRS = 10dB and αR,E = 1. As seen in Fig.8, similar
to the last case, AF has a zero interception probability in
the whole SNRR region. As SNRR increases, the bounds
on the interception probability for AF and DF are 0 and 1
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Fig. 7. Interception probability comparison of AF and DF relaying schemes
with different SNRS .
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Fig. 8. Interception probability comparison of AF and DF relaying schemes
with different SNRR.
respectively, which proves Lemma 2, Lemma 4, and Lemma
8 again.
VI. CONCLUSION
A major contribution of this paper is the introduction of
LS-MIMO relaying techniques into physical layer security that
leads to significant enhancement of secrecy outage capacity,
even when the interception distance is short. This paper
focuses on the analysis and comparison of secrecy outage
capacity under AF and DF relaying schemes, and derives
explicit expressions in terms of transmit SNRs, CSI accuracy,
antenna number and interception distance. Furthermore, we
carry out asymptotic analysis on the secrecy outage capacity
and interception probability and get clear insights from them.
Altogether, these results provide some important guidelines
for the design of LS-MIMO relaying schemes for secure
communications. For example, AF and DF has the same
performance at high source transmit power. It is better to
choose AF due to the lower complexity. Moreover, there is
an optimal relay transmit power at medium regime.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Based on the SNR γAFD at the destination, the achiev-
able legitimated channel rate is given by (27) at the top
of the next page, where W is a half of the spectral band-
width, since a complete transmission requires two time slots.
R(x) denotes the real part of x. hR,D is replaced by√
ρhˆR,D+
√
1− ρe in (25). Eq. (26) follows from the fact that
ρ‖hˆR,D‖2 scales with the order O(ρNR) as NR → ∞ while
2
√
ρ(1− ρ)R(eH hˆR,D) + (1 − ρ)‖ehˆHR,D‖2/‖hˆR,D‖2 scales
as the order O(√NR), which can be negligible. Eq. (27) holds
true because of lim
NR→∞
‖hˆR,D‖2
NR
= 1 and lim
NR→∞
‖hS,R‖2
NR
= 1,
namely channel hardening [38]. Therefore, we get the Theo-
rem 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
According to (4), for a given ε, we have
ε = Pr
(
CAFSOC > C
AF
D −W log2(1 + γAFE )
)
= Pr
(
γAFE > 2
(CAFD −C
AF
SOC)/W − 1
)
= 1− F
(
2(C
AF
D −C
AF
SOC)/W − 1
)
, (28)
where F (x) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of
γAFE . In order to derive the secrecy outage capacity, the key
is to get the cdf of γAFE . Examining (10), due to channel
hardening, we have
γAFE =
dNR
∣∣∣hHR,E hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣2
e
∣∣∣hHR,E hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣2 + cNR + 1 . (29)
Since hˆR,D/‖hˆR,D‖ is an isotropic unit vector and indepen-
dent of hR,E ,
∣∣∣hHR,E hˆR,D/‖hˆR,D‖∣∣∣2 is χ2 distributed with 2
degrees of freedom. Let y ∼ χ22, we can derive the cdf of γAFE
as
F (x) = Pr
(
dNRy
ey + cNR + 1
≤ x
)
. (30)
If x < dNR/e, then we have
F (x) = Pr
(
y ≤ (cNR + 1)x
dNR − ex
)
= 1− exp
(
− (cNR + 1)x
dNR − ex
)
. (31)
Since x ≥ NR/e is impossible when x = 2(C
AF
D −C
AF
SOC)/W −
1, we have
ε = exp

− (cNR + 1)
(
2(C
AF
D −C
AF
SOC)/W − 1
)
dNR − e
(
2(C
AF
D
−CAF
SOC)/W − 1
)

 . (32)
Hence, we get the Theorem 2.
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CAFD = W log2
(
1 +
a|hHR,DhˆR,D|2‖hS,R‖2
b|hHR,DhˆR,D|2 + ‖hˆR,D‖2(c‖hS,R‖2 + 1)
)
= W log2

1 + a
∣∣∣(√ρhˆR,D +√1− ρe)H hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣2 ‖hS,R‖2
b
∣∣∣(√ρhˆR,D +√1− ρe)H hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣2 + (c‖hS,R‖2 + 1)

 (25)
= W log2

1 +
a
(
ρ‖hˆR,D‖2 + 2
√
ρ(1− ρ)R(eH hˆR,D) + (1− ρ)‖ehˆ
H
R,D‖
2
‖hˆR,D‖2
)
‖hS,R‖2
b
(
ρ‖hˆR,D‖2 + 2
√
ρ(1− ρ)R(eH hˆR,D) + (1− ρ)‖ehˆ
H
R,D‖
2
‖hˆR,D‖2
)
+ c‖hS,R‖2 + 1


≈ W log2
(
1 +
aρ‖hˆR,D‖2‖hS,R‖2
bρ‖hˆR,D‖2 + c‖hS,R‖2 + 1
)
(26)
≈ W log2
(
1 +
aρN2R
bρNR + cNR + 1
)
, (27)
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
In an LS-MIMO DF relaying system, the eavesdropper
channel capacity can be expressed as
CDFE =W log2(1+min(PSαS,RNR, PRαR,E
∣∣∣hHR,E hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣2)).
(33)
Then, the secrecy outage probability ε with respect to a
secrecy outage capacity CDFSOC can be computed as (35) at
the top of the next page, where (34) follows from the fact that∣∣∣hHR,E hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣2 is χ2 distributed with 2 degrees of freedom,
and (35) holds true since exp
(
−PSαS,RNRPRαR,E
)
approaches zero
when NR is sufficient large. Based on (35), it is easy to get
the Theorem 3.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
If PS is sufficiently large, the secrecy outage capacity with
respect to a given outage probability ε in an LS-MIMO AF
relaying system can be approximated as
CAFSOC = W log2
(
1 +
PSPRαS,RαR,DρN
2
R
PRαR,DρNR + PSαS,RNR + 1
)
−W log2
(
1 +
PSPRαS,RαR,ENR ln ε
PRαR,E ln ε− 1− PSαS,RNR
)
≈ W log2
(
1 +
PSPRαS,RαR,DρN
2
R
PSαS,RNR
)
−W log2
(
1 +
PSPRαS,RαR,ENR ln ε
−PSαS,RNR
)
(36)
≈ W log2(PRαR,DρNR)
−W log2(−PRαR,E ln ε) (37)
= W log2
(
−αR,DρNR
αR,E ln ε
)
, (38)
where (36) follows the fact that the terms “PRαR,DρNR+1”
and “PRαR,E ln ε−1” in the denominators is negligible when
PS is large enough, and (37) holds true since the constant “1”
is dropper in the case of large PS . From (38), it is known that
the secrecy outage capacity is independent of transmit power
PS and PR, and reduces as the interception distance and the
outage probability decreases, which proves Theorem 4.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
In the case of large PR, the secrecy outage capacity with
respect to a given outage probability ε in an LS-MIMO AF
relaying system can be approximated as
CAFSOC = W log2
(
1 +
PSPRαS,RαR,DρN
2
R
PRαR,DρNR + PSαS,RNR + 1
)
−W log2
(
1 +
PSPRαS,RαR,ENR ln ε
PRαR,E ln ε− 1− PSαS,RNR
)
≈ W log2
(
1 +
PSPRαS,RαR,DρN
2
R
PRαR,DρNR
)
−W log2
(
1 +
PSPRαS,RαR,ENR ln ε
PRαR,E ln ε
)
(39)
≈ W log2(PSαS,RNR)−W log2(PSαS,RNR) (40)
= 0, (41)
where (39) follows the fact that the terms “PSαS,RNR + 1”
and “PRαR,E ln ε−1” in the denominators is negligible when
PR is large enough, and (40) holds true since the constant “1”
is dropper in the case of large PR. From (41), it is found
that the secrecy outage capacity is always equal to zero with
arbitrary transmit powers PS and PR, interception distance
and outage probability, which proves Theorem 5.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
If PS is sufficiently large, the secrecy outage capacity with
respect to a given outage probability ε in an LS-MIMO DF
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ε = Pr(C
DF
SOC > C
DF
D − CDFE )
= Pr

min

PSαS,RNR, PRαR,E
∣∣∣∣∣hHR,E hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2

 > 2(CDFD −CDFSOC)/W − 1


= Pr

PSαS,RNR ≤ PRαR,E
∣∣∣∣∣hHR,E hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2

Pr (PSαS,RNR > 2(CDFD −CDFSOC)/W − 1)
+Pr

PSαS,RNR > PRαR,E
∣∣∣∣∣hHR,E hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2

Pr

PRαR,E
∣∣∣∣∣hHR,E hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2
> 2(C
DF
D −C
DF
SOC)/W − 1


= exp
(
−PSαS,RNR
PRαR,E
)
+
(
1− exp
(
−PSαS,RNR
PRαR,E
))
exp
(
−2
(CDFD −C
DF
SOC)/W − 1
PRαR,E
)
(34)
≈ exp
(
−2
(CDFD −C
DF
SOC)/W − 1
PRαR,E
)
, (35)
relaying system can be computed as
CDFSOC = W log2 (1 + min(PSαS,RNR, PRαR,DρNR))
−W log2 (1− PRαR,E ln ε)
= W log2 (1 + PRαR,DρNR)
−W log2 (1− PRαR,E ln ε) (42)
= W log2
(
1 + PRαR,DρNR
1− PRαR,E ln ε
)
, (43)
where (42) follows the fact of
min(PSαS,RNR, PRαR,DρNR) = PRαR,DρNR at a
large PS . From (43), it is found that the secrecy outage
capacity is independent of PS , and declines as the interception
distance the outage probability decrease. Furthermore, if PR
is relatively large, the secrecy outage capacity can be
approximated as
CDFSOC = W log2
(
−αR,DρNR
αR,E ln ε
)
, (44)
where (44) holds true since the constant “1” in both the
denominator and the numerator is negligible when PR is high.
Interestingly, it is found that DF has the same secrecy outage
capacity as AF, which proves the claims in Theorem 6.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 7
In the case of large PR, the secrecy outage capacity with
respect to a given outage probability ε in an LS-MIMO DF
relaying system can be approximated as
CDFSOC = W log2 (1 + min(PSαS,RNR, PRαR,DρNR))
−W log2 (1 + PRαR,E ln ε)
= W log2 (1 + PSαS,RNR)
−W log2 (1− PRαR,E ln ε) (45)
= 0, (46)
where (45) follows the fact of
min(PSαS,RNR, PRαR,DρNR) = PSαS,RNR at a large PR,
and (46) holds true because of CDFSOC ≥ 0. From (46), it is
found that the secrecy outage capacity is always equal to
zero with arbitrary transmit powers PS and PR, interception
distance and outage probability. In addition, DF has the same
secrecy outage capacity as AF, which proves Theorem 7.
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